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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
ference from the press and radio. Courts seem to avoid drawing a line as to
the time element, so as to reach satisfactorily a point where a public personage
may, by voluntarily retiring from the public's gaze, return to the status of a
private individual.
7
Two leading cases, each of which concerned publicity of an incident which
had occurred many years before, have reached opposite conclusions. The
courts predicated their decisions on different grounds, one allowing recovery 9
and the other denying it," but both completely side-stepped consideration of
the passage of time and the change of circumstances in reaching their de-
cisions.
If the elements of lapse of time and change of conditions had been given
proper weight by the courts in reaching their decisions in these cases, it is
submitted that the results in both of these cases and in the case under dis-
cussion could have been more consistent.
The court in the instant case stated that the right of privacy of the
plaintiffs could have been violated by unwarranted and offensive publicity
with reference to their deceased father, but recovery was denied because the
passage' of time could not erase the fact that he was a public figure, since his
story was a part of the community's history. Thus, there resulted a waiver of
the right of privacy of himself and his family in regard to this incident. It would
seem that the dissemination of news of this event which occurred sixteen years
previously did, in itself, constitute such unwarranted and offensive publicity
affecting these innocent members o the family living in the community that
it should be actionable by them. It is trite that each case presented to the
court because of an alleged invasion of the right 'of privacy involves its own
peculiar circumstances. However, it is submitted that when a court must
draw the line between freedom of speech and press on the one hand, and an
individual's right of privacy on the other, and there is )resent a considerable
passage of time plus a voluntary change of circumstances, the court should
not avoid these two elements in reaching its decision, but should place greater
emphasis upon them.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-DISQUALIFICATION FOR
PARTICIPATION IN A LABOR DISPUTE
Respondents, women employees of the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Company, refused to cross a picket line maintained by a union of which they
7. 41 Am. Jur. 939.
8. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931) (a prostitute changed her
way of life, married and settled in a community. Years later a motion picture was made
of her previous way of life).
9. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (C. C. A, 2d 1940) (a boy genius withdrew
from the limelight to live a life of seclusion. After many years passed, a newspaper printed
an article concerning his past life).
CASES NOTED
were not members, claiming fear of violence and bad publicity. The State Com-
missioner of Unemployment Compensation denied them compensation benefits,
finding that there was no violence or reasonable fear of violence. The superior
court reversed the Commissioner's decision and allowed recovery. Held, on
appeal, that the claimants were participating in a labor dispute, thereby dis-
qualifying themselves from benefits tinder the Washington Unemployment
Compensation Law.1 Matter of Appeals of Employees of Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 198 P.2d 675 (Wash. 1948).
Induced by the Federal Social Security Act, similar unemployment
compensation laws have been enacted by all the states and by Alaska,
Hawaii, and the District of Columbia. 2 The avowed purpose of these laws is to
remedy the unpleasant consequences of unemployment.3 Because of their
remedial nature, 4 they should be liberally interpreted in the employee's favor.
6
Considering the facts of the instant case it would seem that the respondents
could have been declared ineligible for leaving work voluntarily and without
good cause,6 or possibly for not seeking further employment.7 However, basing
its decision on a previous case, 8 the court chose to disqualify them under the
participation in a labor dispute clause 9 since their refusal to cross the picket
line placed the strikers in a superior bargaining position.
Participate means to take part.10 To hold that one takes part in a labor
dispute solely because his inaction serves to benefit the strikers' position is a
1. Sec. 77 of the Washington Unemployment Compensation Act, REM. Sure. § 9998-
215 (1945), provides: "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits for any week with
respect to which the Commissioner finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of
work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other
premises at which he is or was last employed: Provided, That this section shall not apply if
it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that (a) he is not participating in or
financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work;
. (Italics added.)
2. 48 Am. Jur. 520.
3. Tube Reducing Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 56 A.2d 596
(N. J. 1948) ; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 104 Utah
175, 134 P.2d 579 (1943) ; Godsol v. Michigan, 302 Mich. 652, 5 N.W.2d 519 (1942)
Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W.2d 929 (1940).
4. Department of Industrial Relations v. Drummond, 30 Ala. App. 91, 1 So.2d 395
(1941) ; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra.
5. See note 3 su pra; Taylor v. McSwain, 54 Ariz. 295, 95 P.2d 415 (1939) ; Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations v. Drummond supra; Rass. Supe. § 9998-141 (Wash. 1945),
"this act shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemploy-
ment and the suffering caused thereby to the minimum,"
6. See. 73, REM. Sup. § 9998-211 (Wash. 1945), which provides: "An individual
shall he disqualified for benefits for the calendar week in which he has left work volun-
tarily without good cause ..."
. See. 68, REM. SuPP. § 9998-206 (Wash. 1945), which provides: "An unemployed
individual shall be eligible to receive waiting period credit or benefits with respect to any
week only if the Commissioner finds that....
"(c) he is able to work, and is available for work in any trade, occupation or business
for which he is reasonably fitted. To be available for work an individual must be ready.
able, and willing, immediately to accept any suitable work which may be offered to him
and must be actively seeking work .. "
8. In re Persons Employed at St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wash. 580, 110
P2d 877 (1941).
9. See note I supro.
10. State v. Dade County, 144 Fla. 448, 198 So. 102 (1940).
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potentially dangerous concept of participation." A strict application of this
rule would seem to preclude recovery in a similar situation though it has been
proved that there was a reasonable fear of violence. The benefit to the strikers
would be identical whether or not the abstinence from crossing the picket lines
was voluntary. Yet where the facts justify not crossing the picket lines,
benefits should be and have been allowed. 12 Any other result would obviously
be unfair and contrary to the legislative intent.' Interpretations of labor
dispute disqualification clauses by courts which follow the letter of the law
rather than its spirit, where the two conflict, have caused rather unhappy
results. 14 Courts reaching such decisions hesitate to construe liberally any part
of the statute which seems clear and unambiguous on its face, regardless of the
social implications involved.'5 In the light of this judicial attitude, it is sub-
mitted that the legislatures should specifically define the terms which are used
in this type legislation in order to insure that the legislative intent is carried
out.16
i1. The following decisions seem strongly influenced by the Washington concept ol
participation: Aitkin v. Board of Review of Unemployment Compensation Commission,
56 A.2d 587 (N. J, 1948) ; Brown v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board, 55
A.2d 696 (Md. 1947) ; Bunny's Waffle Shop v, California Employment Commission, 24
Cal.2d 735, 151 P.2d 224 (1944).
12. Steamship Trade Ass'n. of Baltimore v. Davis, 57 A.2d 818 (Md. 1948).
13. See note 5 supra.
14. Kemiel v. Review Board, 72 N.E.2d 238 (Ind. 1947); Nobes v. Michigan Unem-
ployment Compensation Commission, 313 Mich. 472, 21 N.W.2d 820 (1946) ; Members of
Ire' Workers Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 242, 139 P.2d 208
(1943); Chrysler Corporation v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (1941) ; Miners in
General Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941) ; Barnes v. Hall, supra.
15. Bodinson Manufacturing Co. v. California Employment Commissioner, 101 P.2d
165, off'd, 17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.24 935 (1941).
16. Cf. Fierst and Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 49 YAl E
L. J. 461 (194D), where the repeal of labor dispute disqualifications is urged.
